Why Italy Rejects Democratic Rule by Benito Mussolini (1928)

Premier of Italy

* Source: Accessed on 26/6/2022 from jstor.org

* First published: Current History (1916-1940)

Vol. 28, No. 2 (MAY, 1928), pp. 180-188 (9 pages)

Published by: University of California Press

HONORABLE COLLEAGUES!-The constructive work of the new Fascist State which the Government has undertaken with the con bound, in a certain degree, to affect the nature of the Elective Chamber. Not that the official activity of the Assembly created by the general elec tions of May, 1924, based on universal suffrage, was not, after the crisis of the first period, wholly praiseworthy and sincerely loyal to the and to the Government; on contrary, this Chamber the con régime must be given credit for having functioned as a Constituent Assembly of the new régime Sgime in an invariably Fascista spirit, thus winning for itself a permanent place in the history of the new Italy. On the other hand, some of the constitutional laws, which have now been in force for some time, such as the law on the functions of the Prime Minister, and that regarding the power of the Government to issue juridical rules and regulations, had, de jure, as well as de facto, profoundly transformed the institution of Parliament, eliminating the abuses of almost half a century of constitutional practice contrary to both the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and which finally degenerated, primarly because of the system of proportional representation, into the most detestable tyranny of parties and groups. Nevertheless, the electoral system in vigor hitherto could not en dure, either because it was based on principles opposed to the very essence of Fascism, or because it was no longer in keeping with the new social and political developments resulting from the entrance of the syndicates into the life of the State, as true and genuine organizations governed by public law.

Some people thought that the logic of the Fascist doctrine would lead straight to the abolishment of the second Chamber and of every form of election; but this conclusion, as a matter of fact, does not at all correspond to the Fascist conception of the modern State. Fascism, in combating the State's Parliamentary and electoral degeneration, and in the need of a strong State had no intention of restoring the old, absolutist régime, close and of reconstructing, on the ruins of the democratic liberal State, a "police" [viz., despotic] State. On the contrary, Fascism wishes to create a régime possessing authority, in which shall stand out prominently Government endowed with wide powers, but based upon the masses, to the masses, resolved, by means of a multiplicity of organizations, to maintain this contact with the people, to interpret the latter's neeeds, to shape its civil and moral consciousness, to uplift it spiritually and to guide it to the attainment of better economic conditions. No Fascist has ever entertained the thought of bringing the nation's Government under the power of an oligarchy; all those who planned in thought and deed for the advent of Fascism wished, on the contrary, to create a régime whose ruling class should draw continuously from the people the new men needed to continue and perpetuate its own existence.

We recognize the fact that Parliament can today no longer be the sole means by which the Government can gain contact with the masses and keep in touch with the feelings that move them and influence their minds. But there is no doubt that an assembly composed of men who, by virtue of their origin and the method of their election, are at one and the same time interpreters of the dominating ideas of the various groups of which the nation is composed, and conscious representatives of the great and historic interests of the nation must find a place among the constitutional organs of the State as a most valuable collaborator of the

Government. Only it is clear that in the political system created by Fascism, the electoral Assembly must be constituted on bases fundamentally different from those of the old Chamber of the democratic liberal régime.

The dogma of popular sovereignty, in fact, had affected not only the functioning, but also the formation of the Chamber of Deputies, viz., the electoral system. That dogma, on the one hand, made the Chamber the sole repository of sovereignty, and hence the dominating organ of the State, and, on the other hand, led to abandoning the choice of Deputies completely to the will of the masses.

The rror of such a conception was evident. The masses by themselves alone are incapable of of forming spontaneously a collective will of their own, and even less capable of proceeding spontaneously to a selection of men to represent them [viz., Deputies]. This is expressed by the for mula: "Democracy does not exist in Nature." Where a hundred people are assembled, they are inevitably led by one, or two, or three individuals, who guide them in accordance with their own interests and their own opinions. This phenomenon is due to a fundamental law of social life, which Maine¹ defined as a law of "imitation," and by the operation of which the great mass of men tends to do that which is desired by a few dominating elements, the so-called "directing minds." The problem of the Government, therefore, is never solved by relying on an illusory will of the masses; it is solved by a wise choice of the directing minds. But the di recting minds as a matter of fact are not always the best minds, nor do they always employ the best methods of direction. On the contrary, if a good system of selection is not organized the natural course of events often brings forth those men who are least worthy to be the leaders of the masses. Experience teaches that it is the schemers, the agitators, the demagogues who guide the masses when they are left uncontrolled. To place the choice of candidates and Deputies completely in the hands of the electoral body, composed of an inchoate mass of heterogeneous indi viduals, means in reality placing this choice in the hands of a few intriguers who appoint themselves to be the spiritual guides and teachers of the masses.

Nor did the system of giving to political parties a predominant rôle, entrusting to them the nomination of candidates, as a unit on the electors power of choice, appear any better in practice, for that task was assumed, in reality, as was logical and only to be expected, by those parties which were most unscrupulous, least concerned with the national interest, most hostile to the State. Then, too, from the theoretical too, viewpoint, under such a system, in which groups, committees and designate candidates, the freedom of choice of the elector is reduced even nominally to the narrowest limits. The dogma of popular sovereignty in the matter of elections thus a of the sovereignty of parties finally resolves itself practically into the dogma small minorities made up of intriguers and demagogues.

Nor is this the sole error of the electoral systems hitherto tried. Inasmuch as they are all constructed upon a territorial basis, they split up the Nation, creating with the electoral colleges or districts so many separate centres of life, in which the viewpoint of local interests becomes all-absorbing, completely overshadowing that of the Nation's interests. Vainly does the Constitution admonish that the Deputy represents the whole Nation and not merely the electoral district in which he has been elected. In practice, it is just the contrary that takes place, and must inevitably take place, for the local limitation of the polling cannot fail to concentrate the attention of the electors and of the elected alike primarily upon local problems.

But this limitation also produces other evils. First of all, it intensifies local disputes between the various regions, irritating that local or parochial spirit which is a sad heritage of our past and which united Italy must combat in every way possible; it also stirs up controversy between indi viduals of the same region, continually inciting those personal conflicts which are a long-standing cause of our political weakness through the centuries. The localization of the electoral contests, moreover, often leads to the exclusion of the best minds from public life. Within the narrow orbit of an electoral district those men who have local the ones who chiefly emerge, while those who play a larger part in e nation's life and who keep aloof from local disputes are ignored. A great scientist, a great political writer, a great artist, who have lived far from their native town, have very little chance, in general, of ever becoming Deputies. Every one knows how difficult it was, even in days of limited suffrage and a very concentrated form of political life, to find an electoral district for men like Silvio Spaventa and Ruggero Bonghi.²

In short, all these electoral systems ignore the real nature of social life, in which individuals as such do not exist, or have only a negligible value. Society is not a mere aggregation of men, it is the product of a series of minor groupings which intertwine and co-exist organically. It is these minor organisms that stamp the character of the national life in which the individual is moulded, and from which he derives a good part of the basic principles of his spiritual life. To be ignorant of these organ isms means the holding of a completely false idea of social life, which is a serious matter to those who seek in the system of political representation a perfect reflection of the people's soul and the expression of the people's will.

All these errors must be avoided, and fortunately the Fascist concep tion of the State makes this possible. Fascist doctrine denies the dogma of popular sovereignty, which is

contradicted every day by reality, and in its stead proclaims the dogma of the sovereignty of the State, the State being the juridical organization of the nation and the instrument of its historical necessities. In this doctrine Parliament is not outside the State; it is, on the contrary, one of its fundamental organs. The Deputies, consequently, are also organs of the State. Their selection cannot, therefore, proceed as a logical con sequence from an abstract principle; it must be concretely regulated and controlled in the best way pattained. And since the first duty of the of the institution may be in order that the ultimate objectives Chamber of Deputies is to collaborate with the Government in shaping the laws, making itself an interpreter of the needs and sentiments of the rious social groups, which constitute such a great and important part various of the national life, and harmonizing them with the historical and inherent necessities of that national life, it is clear that a good electoral system must be based above all upon the concurrent action of the totality of the organized forces of the country, and must further guarantee that the men chosen to constitute the Chamber shall be fully aware of the national interests, shall be, that is, statesmen in the loftiest sense of of the word. ord.

From these basic principles derives the system adopted in the bill which we have the honor of now presenting to you for your examination. The first characteristic of the new electoral instrument is the total elimination of all local criteria in the choice of Deputies, and the incor poration of the whole kingdom into a single national electoral constitueney. In this new unified electoral constituency the number of Deputies is re duced to 400 (Article 1).

The second characteristic of the system that we propose is the notable, if not decisive stress laid upon that element of the elections which con sists of the presentation of the candidates. Juridically, this factor was not brought out in the previous systems. The choice of candidates was left to the political parties, or rather, to a certain number of electors, uniting as the occasion of the electioneering required when the elections were formally announced, to present either the candidate or the list of candidates. In the present law, on the contrary, only syndical organiza tions legally recognized, and, in the second place, other permanent organi zations which carry on cultural, educational or charitable activities, are called upon to propose candidates. The syndical organizations which have the right to propose candidates are the great national Confederations listed in the provisions for the enactment of the law of April 3, 1926, approved by Royal Decree on July 1, 1926: viz., the thirteen large organizations, in which are united, on a national basis, all forces of production, all classes of professional people and artists (Article 3). It may be said that every form of organ ized activity in Italy is included in these organizations. In addition to these thirteen syndical Confederations the projected law confers the right to propose candidates on other organizations, whose activities fall outside the professional sphere, provided they have national importance and pur sue objects of social utility (Article 4). This removes the objection that the basis of the new electoral system is exclusively economic, and there fore such as to produce form of representation devoid of political char acter, thus deforming the ideals and fundamental characteristics of the Fascist State itself. First of all, it should be noted that amongst the Syndical Confederations there is one, viz., the thirteenth, comprising the professional and artistic classes, which does not aim solely at the protec tion of material interests, but rather, and above all, at the protection of moral interests, which are those of the nation's cultural life. To this organization the table appended to the law gives the right to designate one-fifth of all the candidates. Furthermore, the associations listed in Article 4 give an additional contribution to the process of supplementing the representative, body by intellectual and spiritual forces which, we may be sure, will be more numerous in the new Chamber than they were in previous Chambers. Nor should we forget the lofty function, both perfective and 1 compensatory in character, given by Article 5 of the pro jected law to the Council. Of this we shall speak later. But we should point out here that its main motive is to make among possible to include the Deputies elements of high intellectual value, which might have been left out of the lists of candidates.

The choice of candidates is for the first time carefully regulated by law; the organizations are listed with precision, which are to be charged with this duty, and the method of procedure prescribed. By virtue of the provisions of Articles 3 and 4, the presentation of candidates assumes the true form of a preliminary election, to which are summoned the Na Councils of thirteen Confederations and the directive organs tional Co of the other organizations indicated in Article 4, in accordance with the of the provisions of the Royal Decree which confers on them the right of pro posal. This preliminary election will be effected by an electoral body of the most select nature, but which includes the leading elements of the nation's economic life, as well as of its intellectual and forexe, as spiritual real and deliberate designation, not This election will then be in effect a illa will which in reality does not the purely formal expression of the ence of exist of masses abandoned to the influence irresponsible demagogues. life.

The thirteen Confederations propose, according to the projected law, a a total number of candidates double that of the Deputies to be elected; 800, then, in the general elections. The table appended to the projected law divides and apportions the candidates among the various Confedera tions, fixing the number which each Confederation is called upon to pro pose for every hundred candidates. At the head of the list, naturally, stands Agriculture; there then follows, in decreasing order, industry, commerce, maritime transports, land transports and banks. Employers of labor and workers are placed on a footing of complete equality; both propose for each branch of productive activity, an equal number of candi dates. Last of all come the Confederations of the professional and artistic. classes, in which the distinction between employers and employes does not obtain, and to which, because of its vital importance, 20 per cent. of the candidates to be proposed, is assigned.

Organizations and associations of a national character which conduct activities of social utility, propose a total number of candidates equal to one-fourth of the Deputies to be elected; or 100 candidates in the gen eral elections. Organizations on which this right has been conferred are included in a list, to be be approved by Royal Decree, in conformity with the opinion of a Commission of five Deputies and five Senators; this guar antees that the conferring of the right in question shall be effective with out any substantial interference of the executive power. By allowing a certain number of non-syndical organizations to propose candidates, not only is the representation of the moral forces of the Nation increased, but also the elective Chamber is made accessible to men who are worthy of this honor, by reason of their culture and patriotism, but who are not members of the economic and political organizations of Fascism.

The third characteristic of the system adopted in the projected law is the predominant and decisive function given, in the election of Dep

uties, to the National Grand Council of Fascism. This organization, which has played such an important part in the progressive developments of the Fascist Revolution, exists today only de facto. As always happens in the evolution of Fascist institutions, here, too, the fact has preceded the legal confirmation. But it is clear that as soon as possible, in accord with the vote of the Grand Council it self, we shall have to establish the Grand Council upon a legal basis as fundamental, and hence constitutional organ of the State. But already, as now constituted, the Grand Council appears as the supreme coordinat ing organ of the various organized forces of the régime that is, the syn thesis of national life. And since the Fascist régime is the mode of exist ence of the State, whether from the viewpoint of the spirit, or of the con crete form of organization, it is clear that the Grand Council is functioning today as an organ of the State, an organ in the highest pos also most comprehensive fusdapted especially to the function given sible degree political, which combines within itself, in a most selective, but The Grand Council, therefore, is all the vital forces of the Nation. it by the projected law, viz., to choose from the list of the candidates made up on the basis of the proposals of the various organizations, syndical and non-syndical, the men most suitable, to complete this choice when the in sufficiency of the lists of candidates makes it necessary, by the inclusion of other persons, and to give to the designations the essential political and national stamp which the members of the Elective Chamber should already

possess. The designation of the Grand Council, in point of fact, takes from the candidate the characteristic of being a representative of the organiza tions which have proposed him. On this point it is necessary to be very explicit. The projected law did not, in fact, intend to create a professional or class type of representation. The organizations to which Articles 3 and 4 give the right to propose candidates, must consider only the capacity of the men whom they choose, to perform in Parliament their function as and guardians organs of the State and of the general interests of the Nation. There is, therefore, no representation of class interests, but a choice, from all the various classes, of men worthy of realizing the historic aims of the Nation. The nominees who appear in the guise of guardians of particular interests, will be inexorably eliminated by the Grand Council. The essen tial value of the designation of the Grand Council is, then, above all, to see to it that the nominees are suited to become organs of the State. 

From the judicial point of view, the function of the Grand Council

finds no counterpart in any of the electoral systems hitherto adopted. With the designation of the Grand Council the Deputy's election may be said to to be completed, except for the ratification of the electoral body. That is why the projected law calls the persons included in the list of the Grand Council "designated expression of the juridices." This formula, which recalls an analogous language of ancient Rome, indicates that the choice of the Grand Council represents already from the individual point of view, a nomination, which, to become definitive, needs the approval which the electoral body gives, not so much to the single nominations as to the political trend shown by the Grand Council in drawing up the list. In reality, in the projected law, a rôle, and a very important rôle, i reserved to the electoral body. This body is not, according to the usual fiction of the old electoral systems, called upon to choose the Deputies, whole, but rather to approve the choice made by the organ which sums up in itself all the forces of the nation. This approval does not, and cannot, apply to the individual names; it concerns the list as a in which the names are only the expression of a political trend. It is, then, es sentially this trend which the electors are called upon to approve; there fore the elector does not vote, according to Article 6 of the projected law, for the names on the list, but rather for the symbol on the list, viz., the Fascio Littorio [Lictoral Fasces]. Thus we return to the reality of things, which has always been ignored by the electoral systems of the past. The elector is not called upon to perform an impossibility: viz., to choose one or more persons whom he does not know, of whom often he has never even heard. He is called upon to declare whether the general political trend which the régime follows, and which finds in the list a concrete expression, is approved by him. This already is quite difficult, but cer tainly that which is thus required of him is less far from possibility [than

the old system]. The election, therefore, is reduced to a simple expression of agree ment or dissent regarding a system of Government, a political trend; an expression not difficult even for a person of average education and average culture to make, and which is formulated by a simple yes or no.

The formula seems like a plebiscite, but it should not lead to any institution. misconception regarding the real character of the inst declaration asked from the electors there is no intention of honoring the principle of popular sovereignty. There is no contradiction between the Fascist doctrine, which rejects the sovereignty of the polls, and this voting by yes or no which is asked of the electoral body as a ratification of the list of designated candidates. First of all, this right of vote is not con ferred upon the citizen as such, but only on one who has an active share in the nation's life, above all as a producer and then as 10). Secondly, it is not in deference to any presumptive sovereignty of taxpayer (Article the elector that the latter is asked to give his judgment on the political trend marked out by the Grand Council, but to test his state of mind, to maintain, that is, the contact between the State and the masses and to improve it continuously. Moreover, the function of the electoral body in every case is limited by the function of the Chamber, to the election of which it [the electoral body] contributes. Having denied that sovereignty is vested wholly in the electoral Chamber, we also deny that sovereignty resides in the elector. We do not thereby impair the value of the ap proval which is asked from the electoral body, and which is certainly important. This value also finds a juridical recognition in the projected law, which provides for the case that the requested opinion of the electoral body should be unfavorable, and means are provided to resolve constitu tionally the conflict which might eventually arise between the electoral body and the Grand Council.

In conclusion, the election of the Deputies becomes, under the system of the projected law, what is called in legal parlance a "complex act," which consists of three successive acts: the proposal of the candidates made by the organizations Council; the given this right by law; the designation by the Grand legal value, but only th by the electoral body. All three have their own only the three taken together constitute the election and

legally create the Deputy. Let us pass over the provisions of Article 7, which concern the pro cedure for the balloting, and dwell instead on the provisions of Articles 8 and 9, in which the list's rejection is hypothetically foreseen. The problem presented by the disapproval of the electoral body,

though only hypothetical, could not be neglected and was technically one of the most difficult to solve. Evidently, once the principle of appealing to the electoral body for ratification of the choice of the Grand Council was adopted, it was necessary to provide legally for the hypothesis of an unfavorable vote. By adopting a different procedure, a law would have been formulated in which the possibility of a constitutional crisis was admitted without any attempt to offer a legal solution. Rather than to reduce ourselves to such a logical and legal absurdity, it would have been wiser for us to abandon recourse to the electoral body completely, and to assign to the Grand Council the definitive nomination of the Deputies. As it did not seem expedient to do this, it was necessary to combine in the law itself a constitutional solution of an eventual conflict between the Grand Council and the electoral body.

The legal basis of the system stem adopted in the projected law lies in the imposing array of the economic, political and social forces called upon to present the candidates and to designate the Deputies; the importance of these forces gives a well-founded presumption that the great majority of the citizens approves the choice so made. When we realize that the thirteen Syndical Confederations represent all Italian producers and, it be said, all the professional people and artists; that other forces and may be certainly quite notable ones are represented by the other organizations authorized, under the provisions of Article to propose candidates; that in the Grand Council the National Fascist Party conspicuously repre sented, with its great and numerous organizations; ; organizations of Italian youth, military, sport, the Dopo Lavoro,³ public welfare workers, all of which comprise millions of Italians; we must conclude that the procedure recommended by the law has, a priori, the approval of the great majority of the citizens. This presumption, which might logically become a pre sumption iuris et de iure, in the projected law, gives ground for a pre sumption iuris tantum, against which the contrary proof is permissible.

If, by chance, the test should result unfavorably and ratification by the electoral body be denied, this evidently means that a crisis has arisen, whereby the legal representatives of the organized forces of the Nation are in conflict with those whom they represent. In such a contingency, the pos sibility of which is difficult to conceive, the only resource will be to initiate a free competition amongst all those who seriously claim to repre sent the masses, in order to decide who, in point of fact, is the interpreter of their opinions. In this test legal organization as such will disappear: every organization which exists even only de facto, and which is sufficiently numerous to present itself as a plausible representative of wide social classes, will be permitted to present lists of candidates, and the elec toral body will decide. Such an experiment should not be given greater im portance than it deserves. We must not assume that the life of the State or of the régime depends on such a decision, which can be useful only to re-es tablish by legal means the harmony between the representatives of the forces existing in the Nation and those whom they represent which has eventually broken down; and to find guidance in shaping Government policy in the opinions prevailing amongst the masses.

Nor does this measure represent any concession to an alleged ballot sovereignty; we merely wish to maintain unimpaired the principle that the modern State cannot cut itself off from the masses, and that the Gov ernment, even though it must not depend upon those masses, should never theless govern together with them.

The procedure fixed by Articles 8 and 9 for the elections with rival lists, in case the list of the Grand Council is rejected, is substantially an election by ballot on a national list, with the vote limited and minorities represented.

The last article of the projected law provides for the abrogation of all laws bearing on Parliamentary disabilities, this being a natural con sequence of the right conferred on the Grand Council to designate the Deputies, and confers on the Royal Government, under proper guarantees, the right to modify the electoral law in force, to initiate the measures re quired for the enforcement of the new law and to publish a new text of the political electoral law.

Honorable colleagues! The bill, which we feel sure will have your ap proval, does not aim to solve definitely the grave problem of political rep resentation; but it faces that problem in an entirely new manner in har mony with the conception of State which Fascismo is making a reality and with the political necessities of the moment. Experience will show whether, as we firmly believe, this law will be able to give us an elective Chamber, which shall be, at the same time, near to the soul of the people and an active and conscious instrument of the Nation's fortunes.

NOTES

* This explanation of the fundamental features of Italy's new electoral law was em bodied in Premier Mussolini's report laid be fore the Chamber of Deputies on March 2, 1928, in presenting the law, which was passed by the Chamber on March 16, with only two dissenting votes, and which centres electoral and Parliamentary control in the Fascist State. [The official text of the law will be found at the end of this symposium.]

1. Sir Henry James Sumner Maine, a famous British political scientist (1822-1888).

2. Eminent political figures of the past, both of whom were hostile to the Bourbons, had stormy political careers, and held Govern ment portfolios. Spaventa, as Secretary General for Home Affairs, vainly endeavored to crush the Camorra in South Bonghi (elected a Deputy in 1860taly in 1860. as Minister for Public Instruction a decade and a half later, reformed the Italian educational system.

3. The great national organization, sponsored by the Fascist State, devoted to welfare work among the working classes in their unoccupied time.