Fascism a Universal Phenomenon by Benito Mussolini (1934)

* Source: Delzell, C., 1971. Mediterranean fascism 1919-1945. 1st ed. London: MacMillan, pp.186-190.

* Publishing information: a Speech by Benito Mussolini in Rome's Teatro Reale dell'Opera on March 18, 1934, the occasion of the Quinquennial Assembly of the Regime. Popolo d'ltalia (Rome), No. 67 (Mar. 20, 1934), reprinted in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. by Edoardo and Duilio Susmel (Florence: La F enice, 19 58), Vol. 26, pp. 185-193 passim. Translated by Delzell.

COMRADES! Today marks the second quinquennial assembly of the regime. In the period since 1929 Fascism has changed from an Italian phenomenon into a universal phenomenon.

This is neither the place nor the time for a detailed examination of our international relations. My quick "tour of the horizon" will be limited to those states with which we have common boundaries, and to problems of a rather general character. Our relations with Switzerland are more than cordial. A treaty of friendship signed in 1924 will lapse next September, and we are

ready to renew it for the same period of time. After the war we followed a friendly policy with Austria, based on the defense of her integrity and independence. For a long time we were alone in doing this; but when the situation assumed a dramatic quality, others joined us. We intend to continue along this line of policy. Austria is aware that she can count on us for the defense of her independence as a sovereign state and that we shall spare no effort to improve the condition of her people.

Our relations with Yugoslavia are normal-that is to say, diplomatically correct. It is possible to improve them because the economic relations between our two countries are complementary. The problem of Italo-Yugoslav relations should be faced only when the necessary prerequisites for its solution have been clarified. Our relations with France have improved from a general stand point, but reality impels me to emphasize that not one of the large and small problems that have been on the agenda during the past fifteen years has neared a solution. Nevertheless, a rapprochement along moral lines has been brought about, and as regards some of the most important questions concerning Europe, this is a favorable element that we hope may lead to further developments. During the last few days the President of the Council of Hungary and the Chancellor of the Austrian Republic were the guests of the Italian Government. The protocols we signed show what has been accomplished. It is unnecessary to strain their interpreta tion. Friendly relations exist among Italy, Austria, and Hungary, and since the war these have acquired greater justification and foundation. Hungary, isolated and deprived even of the territories that are absolutely Magyar, found in Italy a sense of comprehen sion and solidarity that is not just of recent origin and that has clearly been expressed in many aspects of our foreign policy. Hungary pleads for "justice" and the fulfillment of the promises solemnly made during the period of the treaties. Italy has sup ported and continues to support this plea. The Hungarians are a strong people who deserve to have, and will have, a better destiny. The protocols, signed a few days ago in Rome, which lay down the conditions for closer collaboration among Italy, Austria, and Hungary, do not exclude further amplifications and more extensive collaboration with other states. It is a question of breaking loose from the realm of phrases and finally and resolutely entering into the realm of facts. 

The problems of a general character concern first of all the League of Nations. The need for reform has almost universally been accepted. It is clear that the proposed reform should be undertaken after the conclusion of the Disarmament Conference, because if the conference fails, the reform of the League of Nations will no longer be necessary and it will be enough to record its death. That the Disarmament Conference will fail, at least as regards its original important objectives, is generally agreed. (In fact, this is the only kind of peaceful agreement that has been reached.) The states that are now armed will not disarm, while those that are not armed will be able to arm themselves to a greater or lesser degree for defensive purposes. The Italian Memorandum has torn off the mask that concealed this problem in its crude reality. If the armed states refuse to disarm, they will not be abid ing by the fifth section of the Versailles Treaty, and they cannot logically oppose the practical application of that parity of rights. which was recognized for Germany in December, 1932. There is no other alternative. It is a pure illusion, perhaps already confirmed by facts, to pretend that a people like the Germans can be kept. eternally disarmed-unless one is going to make it his objective to use force to prevent the eventual rearmament of Germany. But this game would involve one supreme stake: war-viz., the lives of millions of men and the destiny of Europe. We have put forward the proposal that Germany, without further endless evasions, should be allowed to arm to the degree that she requests as far as effectives and defensive matériel are concerned, and that she should also sign a convention along the lines proposed in the Italian Memorandum, in order that among both the large and the small powers of Europe an atmosphere of understanding may be re established, for without this, Europe is doomed to decline. . . .

This hurried survey of foreign policy should be linked, and I do so immediately and logically, with Italy's military problem. Assign ing highest priority to financial retrenchment and making use of the credit balances of the budget which resulted from the unusual situation of 1928, the Fascist Government has considerably re duced military estimates for both last year and next year. But we cannot go any further. Never at any time-and especially today, on account of the paralysis of the so-called Conference on unat tainable Disarmament-was there such a categorical and imperative duty for a nation that must remain alive to keep strong-and even more so in the case of Italy, which must calmly develop the internal, renovating work of the Revolution. It is necessary to be militarily strong, not for aggressive purpose but in order to be able to cope with any emergency...

The military power of a state and the future and safety of a nation are linked to the demographical problem, and this poses a serious problem for all countries of the white race, including our own. I must reaffirm once again, and in the most peremptory manner-and it will not be the last time either-that numbers are the indispensable prerequisite for leadership. Without numerical superiority everything declines, crumbles away, and dies. . . . The notion that an increase of population brings about a condition. of poverty is so idiotic that it does not even deserve the honor of rebuttal....

The historical objectives of Italy have two names: Asia and Africa. South and east are the cardinal points that should excite the interest and determination of Italians. There is little or nothing to do toward the north, and the same is true toward the west, whether it be Europe or overseas. These two objectives of ours are justified by geography and history. Of all the large Western powers of Europe, Italy is the nearest to Africa and to Asia. A few hours by sea and much less by air are enough to link up Italy with Africa and with Asia. Let nobody misunderstand the meaning of this century-old task that I assign to the present and to the future Italian generations. It is not a question of territorial conquests-and this should be heard by everyone, both near and far-but a natural expansion that should lead to collaboration between Italy and the people of Africa, between Italy and the Near East and the Middle East.

The aim we have in mind is the development and exploitation of the still-countless resources of these two continents-and especially Africa and of bringing these areas more closely into the orbit of world civilization. Italy is in a position to accomplish this task. Her location in the Mediterranean, which is resuming its historic role of uniting the East to the West, confers this right and binds Italy to this obligation. We do not intend to claim either monopolies or privileges, but we do claim and we intend to make clear that those countries who arrived ahead of us, those who are satisfied and those who are conservative, should not try to block on every side the spiritual, political, and economic expansion of Fascist Italy....

Anti-Fascism has ceased to exist. ... But there is one danger that can threaten the Regime, and this may be represented by what is commonly called the "bourgeois spirit"-that is to say, a spirit of satisfaction and adjustment, a tendency toward skepticism, com promise, an easy life and advancement.. . I do not exclude the existence of the bourgeois temperament, but I deny that those who have it can be Fascists. The creed of the Fascist is heroism, that of the bourgeois is egoism. There is only one remedy against this danger, the principle of continual revolution.

The fourth great historical epoch of the Italian people-which future historians will label the Epoch of the Blackshirts-has already begun. This epoch will see integral Fascists-that is to say, those who are born, reared, and spend their lives in our climate, and who are endowed with those virtues that confer upon a people the privilege of leadership in the world....